Why Latin America's political polarization is back with a vengeance

Political polarization has returned with a vengeance to Latin America, though its most recent iteration includes not just old battles like income distribution and the role of the private sector, but also immigration.

BNamericas spoke with Javier Corrales, a political science professor at Amherst College in Massachusetts and an expert on the region's democratic history, about Latin America's historic and current struggles with polarization.

BNamericas: Polarization is a constant in the region, with the 1990s seemingly having been the exception. Why is the situation not causing greater concern given the fragility of democracy in Latin America?

Corrales: The high levels of polarization seen in the 1960s and 1970s ended in democratic ruptures throughout the region. What was seen was that democratic governments arrived, but then polarization followed and the governments fell abruptly.

I don't think we are headed for that scenario now, although anything is possible. What we are seeing are governments that end up resigning.

There is a danger that, faced with polarization like this, a leader is tempted like [Venezuela’s late Hugo] Chávez at the time, and as [El Salvador’s] Nayib Bukele is tempted now, to deepen presidentialism while supporters applaud.

I don't think we will see new dictators like [Nicolás] Maduro. There is a long way to go for that to happen. But it is possible that a period will come when presidents are forgiven too many things, and that is very sad.

Chile became famous among adherents of liberal democracy in the period between the 1988 referendum and the second Piñera government, which imposed the idea that groups had to be moderated and that coalitions have to de-radicalize their members.

If that was lost, it would be sad for both Chile and the region.

BNamericas: Among other things, polarization has contributed to Canada’s trucker protests or mobilizations against Chile’s immigration crisis, including road closures, potentially affecting logistics chains. Are more such incidents to be expected?

Corrales: Yes. Fortunately, Chile's economy is very strong. We are not talking about Ecuador or Bolivia, whose economies collapse when they experience such upheavals.

In fact, I doubt Chile will return to the protest process seen at the end of 2019. This type of mobilization makes economies very susceptible, and they reach a point where they stop resisting and collapse. This is especially noticeable in countries dependent on international trade.

Canada is also a very strong country, but it has also reached a point where the prime minister said “this is having such negative consequences on the economy that we have to take action.”

So yes, there is an economic danger, and in particular, I would not want Chile to have a cycle of protests like the one in 2019 again.

The polarization, this idea of “we will not give in,” being intransigent, does not have any approval from me. Politicians in a democracy are supposed to de-radicalize and choose which issues to commit to. Without this, democracy does not work.

BNamericas: Tensions in Chile are also rising in relation to debates in the constitutional assembly about the nationalization of mining, water rights, and private property. Is this a return to 20th-century economic polarization?

Corrales: Sure. The privatization of the Chilean economy, in my opinion, produced economic results that have benefited many people, and those people are not going to want to go back.

In some countries, the opening of the market did not have many winners, but in Chile it did, and then those people are not going to accept going back to a process of nationalization and violation of private property rights.